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CASE COMMENTS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THIRD POLITICAL PARTIES AS
SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS
Williams v. Rhodes, 89 S. Ct. 5 (1968)
The election laws of Ohio virtually foreclosed a position on the Presidential ballot to all but the two major political parties. In order to qualify for
a place on the ballot, a candidate had to obtain the signatures of qualified
electors totaling at least fifteen per cent of those who voted in the last
gubernatorial election., Moreover, he was required to obtain the signatures
in time to participate in a state primary usually held nine months before
the general election. 2 In addition, he had to receive the nomination of a
group that qualified as a "political party" within the meaning of Ohio law.3
In order to qualify as a "political party" in Ohio a group had to meet
elaborate organizational requirements. 4 The Ohio American Independent
Party and the Socialist Labor Party both brought suit to challenge the validity
of these laws on the grounds that the laws denied them and the voters who
might wish to vote for them equal protection of the laws. The special threejudge district court5 designated to hear the case unanimously held that the
restrictive laws were unconstitutional as violative of equal protection.6
However, by a vote of 2-1 it refused to order that the parties' names be
placed on the ballot as requested by petitioners. Instead, it granted relief
only to the extent of instructing the state to make provisions for write-in
votes. Petitioners appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court 7
Mr. Justice Stewart, Circuit Justice for the Sixth Circuit, granted a temporary
injunction ordering the parties' names to be placed on the ballot pending
appeal.3 After a hearing on the merits, the United States Supreme Court
1. Omo REv. CoDE ANN. §3517.01 (Page 1959).
2. Candidates were required to file petitions ninety days before the primary elections,
Omo Ray. CODE ANN. §3513.05 (Page 1959), which were held in early May. Omo Rav. CODE
ANN. §3513.01 (Page 1959).
3. Omo REv. CoDE ANN. §3505.10 (Page 1959).
4. The requirements included participation in the state primary and formation of a
county central committee consisting of one member from each county ward or precinct and
a state central committee consisting of two members from each congressional district, Omuo
REv. CODE ANN. §3517.02-04 (Page 1959); election of delegates and alternates to a national
convention, Omo RV. CODE ANN. §3505.10 (Page 1959); and the holding of a state convention attended by 500 delegates duly apportioned throughout the state according to political strength, Omo REv. CODE ANN. §3513.11 (Page 1959). Additional requirements were
imposed in the form of qualifications of party officers. Candidates for the positions on the
central committee and national convention delegates were required to demonstrate that
they did not vote in any other party primary during the preceding four years, Omo REv.
CODE ANN. §3513.191 (Page 1959), and had to present petitions of endorsement on their
behalf by anywhere from 5 to 100 voters who likewise failed to vote for any other party in
the preceding primary, OHIo Ray. CoDE ANN. §3513.05 (Page 1959).
5. 28 U.S.C. § §2281, 2284 (1964).

6. 290 F. Supp. 983 (SJ). Ohio 1968).
7. Appeals from a three-judge district court are made directly to the United States
Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. §1253 (1964).

8. Williams v. Rhodes, 89 S. Ct. 1 (1968). Subsequently, Justice Stewart denied similar
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HELD, that the Ohio laws violated equal protection and that the American
Independent Party was entitled to the full equitable relief sought. Judgment
affirmed with respect to the Socialist Labor Party but modified with respect
to the American Independent Party granting the latter the right to have
its name printed on the ballot. Chief Justice Warren, Justice Stewart, and
Justice White dissenting, Justice Douglas and Justice Harlan concurring
separately.
Election cases generally conform to a characteristic pattern.9 The state
discriminates against some minority group in relation to other voters. The
federal courts vindicate the victim by placing him at parity with all other
voting groups.
In one series of cases, the Negro was the state's victim. To protect him
against disenfranchisement the court struck down statutes excluding Negroes
from primaries, 10 specifically authorizing a political party to effect such
12
disqualification,"' authorizing a political party to determine voter eligibility,
structuring the electoral process so as to vest in a political party the power to
determine who would run in the primary, 13 gerrymandering electoral districts,' 4 and requiring voters to satisfy registrars of their ability to "understand
and give a reasonable interpretation" of the federal or state constitutions' .5
6
as a condition to voting.'
With Baker v. Cart 7 a new victim emerged seeking federal protection
against state discrimination. The victim was the urban voter and the discrimination consisted of the dilution of his vote vis-4-vis the vote of the rural
elector. The concept of equal protection in voting was expanded to mean
not only that a person otherwise qualified to vote could not be disenfranchised
on account of color but that an individual had a right to have his vote
counted on the basis of "one-man, one-vote.' 8 Discrimination was held to
contemplate dilution of one's vote as well as total disenfranchisement.
The striking feature of the present case is that at the commencement
of the suit presumably everyone in Ohio could vote and everyone's vote
counted equally. No racial or geographic group had been victimized. Instead,
two essentially new victims emerged. One victim was the supporter of a
political party that has been denied a place on the ballot. The discrimination
relief to the Socialist Labor Party on the grounds of that party's delay in bringing its
petition for expanded relief. Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 89 S. Ct. 3 (1968).
9. There are two other discernible patterns to recent election cases: cases upholding
congressional regulation of elections and cases upholding state election laws. See generally
Joyner & Kozlowicz, The Supreme Court and the Electoral Process, 8 ARIz. L. Ryv. 260

(1966).
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, at 149 (1965).
A full account of the states' subterfuges is given in V. KEY, SoutERN POLTICS

533-663 (1949).
17. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
18. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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against him consisted of the denial of his right to vote for the candidate
of his political persuasion. The other victim was the political party itself.
The instant case, together with its companion case, Socialist Labor Party
v. Rhodes," presented the court with a question that according to Chief
Justice Warren "may be fairly classified as one of first impression: to what
extent may a State consistent with equal protection and the First Amendment
guarantee of freedom of association, impose restrictions upon a candidate's
desire to be placed upon the ballot?" 2 0 The basic authority of the state to
regulate the appointment of Presidential electors was never at issue. 21 Nor,
as the two concurring opinions pointed out, was it necessary to decide whether
the state could lawfully appoint electors by a method other than the general
22
ballot.
Justice Black writing for the Court first rejected the argument that article
II, section 2, of the United States Constitution gave the states absolute power
to regulate the selection of electors, stating that while the Constitution gave
extensive power to the states, that power was subject to the limitation that
it could not be exercised in a manner that violated other specific provisions
of the Constitution. The Court held specifically that article II, section 2, was
subject to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Turning to the question whether the court below properly held that the
Ohio laws violated equal protection, the Court asserted that the laws in
question infringed "the right of the individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs" and "the right of qualified voters, regardless of their
political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively."2 3 Justice Black experienced
some difficulty in demonstrating exactly how the Ohio laws restricted free19. 89 S.Ct. 5 (1968).
20. 89 S. Ct. at 80 (Warren, C.J. dissenting). Justice Warren went on to note that
Williams was not actually the first case to contest the constitutionality of laws restricting
new political parties. In MacDougall v. Green, 835 U.S. 281 (1948), the Supreme Court
upheld an Illinois election law requiring nominees for statewide elections to be supported
by a minimum number of persons from at least 50 of the state's 102 counties. However, as
Justice Warren pointed out, MacDougall was decided "during the reign of Colegrove v.
Green, 828 U.S. 549 (1946)" and the "advent of Baker v. Carr, 869 U.S. 186 (1962), and its
progeny have substantially modified the constitutional matrix in this area." 89 S. Ct. at
30 n.10.
21. U.S. CoNsr. art. H, §1. "Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the 'Congress... ..
22. The Court's reference to McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892), albeit in regard
to the political question doctrine probably indicates that it regards that case's substantive
holding as good law. The case was cited with approval by Justice Harlan, concurring, and
Justice Stewart, dissenting. In McPherson the Court upheld the "appointment" of electors
by Michigan as a result of popular elections on a district-wide basis. The Court, however,
went on to recognize the wide scope of state power in this area. Reference was made to the
following earlier and presumably acceptable procedures: (1) by the legislature itself on
joint ballot; (2) by the legislature through a concurrent vote of the two houses; (8) by vote
of the people on a general ticket; (4) by vote of the people by district; (5) partly by the
people voting in districts and partly by the legislature; and (6) by the legislature from
candidates voted for by the people in districts.
23. 89 S.Ct. at 10.
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dom of association. Clearly, the state had not directly limited the petitioners'
right to assemble or discuss public issues. Nor had the state indirectly applied
inhibitory pressure as, for example, by darkly demanding production of
membership lists. 24 Instead, the Court was forced to argue that in denying
the incentive to associate the state had denied the right to associate. "The
right to form a political party ... means little if a party can be kept off the
election ballot and thus denied an equal opportunity to win votes. "' 25 Justice
Stewart, while apparently willing to treat the Court's approach as valid, felt
that certain other incentives had been overlooked. The members of the party
remained "free to assemble, speak, write, and proselytize as they see fit."26
At best, the notion that without a place on the ballot the party's activities
27
would come to a grinding halt was "sheer speculation.."
The Court also gives new meaning to the "right to vote effectively" as
developed in the apportionment cases. 28 Those cases developed a right to
an effective vote in the quantitative sense that each voter is entitled to cast a
vote that has the same numerical weight as that of any other voter in the
jurisdiction. Petitioners in the present case did not claim that this right had
been infringed, but rather that certain voters were denied an effective vote
in that they were unable to vote for a candidate of their political persuasion.
In upholding petitioners' claim the Court has added a qualitative dimension
to the concept of an effective vote. The right to an effective vote now contemplates a vote that can be exercised in a manner that accurately reflects the
voter's own preferences - a situation compatible only with unencumbered
access to a position on the ballot.
Having asserted that the Ohio laws infringed the rights of petitioners,
the Court turned to consider whether the state showed sufficient justification
for its laws in terms of legitimate interests that it sought to protect. The
reasoning pursued here is substantially similar to the traditional analysis of
equal protection as employed in Carrington v. Rash,29 and Skinner v. Oklahoma. 30 According to traditional analysis, citizens are protected only from
unreasonable or "invidious" discrimination. 31 A classification is reasonable
by the usual standard if it bears some rational relationship to a legitimate
state purpose. Here, however, as there was said to be an infringement of the
first amendment freedom of association, 32 it was not enough for the state
to show that its laws were rationally suited to a legitimate state objective;
the state had to show a "compelling" interest. As the Court pointed out, "only
24.
(1958).
25.
26.
27.
28.

29.
30.
31.
32.
derives
Illinois

See Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
89 S. Ct. at 10-11.
Id. at 25 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 27.
E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

380 U.S. 89 (1965).
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
The freedom of association does not appear as such in the first amendment but
from the myriad cases interpreting that provision. See, e.g., Mine Workers v.
Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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a compelling interest .. can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms."3
The Court then faced the issue whether Ohio had successfully met the
strict standard created by the interplay of the first and fourteenth amendments. Ohio asserted four interests in justification of its laws. First, it asserted
an interest in maintaining a two-party system in order to promote compromise
and political stability. The Court pointed out, however, that the Ohio
system in fact promoted two particular parties, the Democrats and the Repub34
licans, improperly assuring them a complete monopoly.
Secondly, Ohio claimed an interest in limiting positions on the ballot
in order that no party would win by a mere plurality of votes. Conceding
that the state might have a valid interest in seeing that the winner of its
election be the choice of the majority, the Court stated that such interest
could not justify laws that virtually stifled the growth of new parties.35
The state suggested, thirdly, that its requirements of a party structure
and an organized primary insured the voters some choice of leadership as
well as issues. The Court replied that as the policies of the two major
parties changed from year to year and the identity of the party's nominee
might not be known until shortly before the election, disaffected persons
would rarely be an identifiable group until a few months before the election.
Ohio's burdensome laws requiring extensive organization and early filing
operated to prevent those persons from placing their representatives on the
ballot, thus denying them an effective choice of leaders and issues.3 6
Finally, Ohio claimed that its highly restrictive provisions were justified
because without them a large number of parties might qualify for the
ballot and thus present the voters with a confusing choice. The Court
pointed to the favorable experience of other states with relatively free access
to the ballot and dismissed the possibility of voter confusion as merely
"theoretically imaginable." 37 In short, the Court held that none of the
interests advanced were sufficiently compelling to justify Ohio's restrictive
laws.
The numerous requirements imposed by Ohio law on a candidate seeking
a position on the ballot could be grouped into, three categories: (1) the
requirement of obtaining petitions signed by qualified voters totaling fifteen
per cent of the persons voting in the last gubernatorial election; (2) the
required filing of the petitions before the state primary; and (3) the requirement that the candidate be nominated by a political party and the various
requirements a group had to meet to qualify as a political party. The
difficulty with all the opinions from the point of view of predicting future
developments is that the series of laws in question is treated as a unit. The
objectionable features of the various Ohio requirements are not very well
isolated or analyzed. For example, it is not clear whether the Court con-

33. 89 S. Ct. at 11, citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
34. 89 S. Ct. at 11.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 11-12.
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sidered the "fifteen per cent" requirement objectionable in itself or only in
connection with the other restrictive regulations38
The Court's opinion, however, does contain certain intimations that
suggest the objectionable element in each of the requirements was simply
a matter of degree. 3 9 Consequently, it seems reasonable to conclude as Chief
Justice Warren does4 ° that a state may condition a place on the ballot on
at least three considerations: (1) substantial showing of voter interest in the
candidate seeking a place on the ballot; (2) a requirement that this interest
be evidenced sometime prior to the election; and (3) a party structure
demonstrating some degree of political organization. In addition, in light
of the Court's unusual step of granting additional injunctive relief specifically
ordering the party's name to be placed on the ballot, it seems reasonable to
conclude that the mere existence of statutory provisions for write-in votes will
not be sufficient to cure otherwise defective regulations.41 Other than suggesting the above factors as proper considerations on which the state might condition a position on the ballot the decision gives no guidance to lower courts or
state legislatures. Like Baker v. Carr 2 the decision does little more than
announce the Court's capacity and willingness to enter a new area of the
political thicket. The question of more exact standards will have to await
a decision in the nature of Gray v. Sanders43 in which the requirements of
equal protection are translated into specific affirmative commands binding on
the states.

44

The basic constitutional dilemma presented in the instant case is the
same one presented in the apportionment cases. By the traditional theory, in
each situation the state legislature appeared to be the proper governmental
38. Of the six justices who filed opinions (Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan, Warren,
Stewart, and White) only Justice Harlan was willing to treat the requirements with any
specificity. Justice Harlan stated: "In my view [the fifteen per cent requirement], even
when regarded in isolation, must fall." 89 S. Ct. at 18. Justice Harlan, however, was unwilling to say what would be an acceptable percentage requirement. The Court itself gave
no real indication how it felt in regard to this matter. At one point the Court called a
requirement of one per cent of the electorate "very low." 89 S. Ct. at 12. However, at
another point it referred to the same test as only "rather lenient." 89 S.Ct. at 12 n.9.
39. The Court speaks of "burdensome procedures requiring extensive organization ...
by a very early date." 89 S. Ct. at 11 (emphasis added). The inference is that some preelection deadline for meeting some organizational requirements may be permissible. In
regard to the numerical requirement of voter interest the Court conceded that such a consideration is at least "relevant in considering whether state laws violate the Equal Protection Clause." 89 S.Ct. at 12.
40. Id. at 31 (Warren, C. J., dissenting).
41. In his concurring opinion Justice Douglas states: "To force a candidate to rely on
write-ins is to burden him with a disability. It makes it more difficult for him to get
elected, and for the voters to elect him." Id. at 14.
42. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
43. 372 U.S. 368 (1963). Gray was the first case to announce the principle "one-man,
one-vote."
44. Presumably, then, a group able to show that it meets certain announced requirements would acquire a federal constitutional status as a political party and thus be auto-

matically entitled to be placed at parity in every respect with all recognized parties within
the state.
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organ to remedy a defect in the electoral system that distorted the popular will.
In the instant case, the Constitution clearly commits the power over the
selection of Presidential electors to the state legislature.45 As a practical
matter, however, the state legislatures are no more likely to lower the barriers
against opposing politicians than they are to reapportion themselves. Thus,
the dilemma is that the only governmental organs that appear to be empowered by the Constitution to act are for practical reasons unable or unwilling
46
to act; the result is that the popular will remains thwarted.
No mention of the dilemma is made in the instant case, but the Court
must have been aware of it. Undoubtedly, appreciation of the problem
influenced the Court's decision to hold that the state's power under article I,
section 2, was limited by the fourteenth amendment. The same consideration
probably also explains the Court's insistence in holding the state to the
"compelling interest" test rather than the "rationally related" test, notwithstanding the fact that injury to the petitioners' first amendment freedoms
was somewhat speculative.
In addition to the question of standards, the decision in the instant case
is easily criticized as an improper application of the principle of the apportionment cases. 47 Undoubtedly, the Court has added a new qualitative
dimension to the concept of effective voting as developed by those cases. The
Court's result is desirable, however, for the simple reason that there is a dear
need to go beyond the principle of purely quantitative equality in voting
in order to insure justice and representative government. The fact is that
the strictest application of the principle of "one-man, one-vote" may leave
many evils unremedied. 4s

45. See note 21 supra.
46. Perhaps the best theoretical justification for the Court acting in such cases is that
its unique position as court of last resort in a representative democracy casts upon it a
duty to enforce a social contract that exists between the people and the governmental
organs that purport to represent them. See Baldwin & Laughlin, The Reapportionment
Cases: A Study in the Constitutional Adjudication Process, 17 U. FLA. L. REv. 301 (1964).
47. See 89 S. Ct. at 15-19 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 19-36 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
48. Both partisan gerrymander and the multi-member district are compatible with the

principle of "one-man, one-vote." Yet either can be employed to effect substantial dilution
of the voting strength of a minority interest group. Gerrymanders are typically used to
disadvantage urban interests by drawing district lines that "quarter" cities. The cities are
divided into sections each of which is combined with a larger rural sector. See R. HANSON,
Tnm PoirrxcAL Tmcsr 124 (1965). The racial gerrymander has been held violative of the
fifteenth amendment, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), although subsequent

cases have demonstrated the difficulty in proving improper intent on the part of the legislature. See Connor v. Johnson, 386 U.S. 483 (1967); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 US. 52
(1964).

However, there have been no cases ruling on the partisan gerrymander.

See

generally Note, Apportionment and the Courts-A Synopsis and Prognosis: Herein of
Gerrymanders and Other Dragons, 49 Nw. U.L. Rv. 500 (1964). Multi-member districts
tend to reduce the voting strength of minority interest groups by enlarging the voting

population against which the minority interest must compete. The Supreme Court in
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), commented that multi-member districts might
validly be employed. See generally Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965); Note, Legislative
Reapportionment-The

Scope of Federal Judicial Relief, 1965 DuKE L.J. 563.
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The Court's result is also desirable in terms of its most immediate practical
consequences. Whether one chooses to view the holding of the instant case
in terms of the rights of individuals or political parties, its practical result
is to grant third parties a new lease on political life. Third parties are now
better able to place their candidates before the public. This is not to suggest
that as a result some new political party is now likely to emerge dominant
in American politics. 49 However, even if third parties remain relatively
insignificant as political forces they perform a valuable function in that often
they present the only real opposition to the policies of the two major parties
and present the voters with the only real alternatives. They should not be
unreasonably denied full participation in the political process. 50
MALCOLM

B.

WISEHEART, JR.

49. See Note, Legal Obstacles to Minority Party Success, 57 YALE LJ. 1275 (1948).
50. "History has amply proved the virtue of political activity by minority, dissident
groups, who innumerable times have been in the vanguard of democratic thought and
whose programs were ultimately accepted. . . . The absence of such voices would be a
symptom of grave illness in our society." Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 251
(1953).
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